This paper exploits the unique institutional features of South Africa to estimate the impact of provincial public spending on health, education and transport on …rm productivity. Our identi…cation strategy is based on within industry-province di¤erences between …rms of the e¤ects of public spending. We show that public spending composition a¤ects …rm productivity depending on the capital intensity of …rms relative to the province-industry mean. Our data and empirical speci…cation allow us to rule out that these results are a¤ected by econometric problems that are commonly encountered when estimating the e¤ects of …scal policy and by unobserved industry-or province-speci…c productivity shocks. In contrast to related existing microeconomic evidence, we take into account the government budget constraint so that our results have clear policy implications.
Non--Technical Summary
Good policy advice, in addition to requiring sound theoretical frameworks to identify growth-enhancing fiscal reforms, also needs a reliable evidence base. Much of this evidence base has tradi-tionally come from applications of econometric methods to various fiscal aggregates. However, con-cerns have recently been raised over the merits of this type of evidence for policy reform advice in practice; see, for example, Rodrik (2005) , Hausmann et al. (2008a) . It seems therefore useful to ques-tion whether business perception data included for instance in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) are a useful additional source of information to guide policy makers' choices. These surveys contain ratings of various factors regarded as 'obstacles' or 'constraints' on firms' growth perfor-mance as identified by firm owners or managers. With firms' investment decisions likely to be an important driver of aggregate economic growth, and these investment decisions likely to be affected by firms' perceptions, such perception indicators could potentially be a valuable source of infor-mation on actual growth constraints. Indeed, a number of authors have recently argued over the merits of such business survey information as a reliable identifier of actual constraints, and the policy reforms that might follow.
The objective of this paper is to examine whether, and when, subjective perceptions of firms may be a useful source of information to help identify growth--enhancing fiscal reforms. Specifically, adopting the standard theoretical framework for the analysis of fiscal policy and long--run growth, we demon-strate that firms' perceptions can be expected to suffer from particular biases. We show that while these biases can be expected to be important for some fiscal policy reform options, they are not for others. This suggests that it is important to distinguish between the specific contexts in which such business perception information is likely to offer reliable or unreliable guidance to growth--enhancing policy reforms. The essence of our argument is that, in part because of the way business survey ques-tions are constructed, firms' responses can be expected to focus on the direct effects of policies alle-viating particular constraints that they see as obstacles, while ignoring the externalities, or indirect effects of these policies. We exploit this assumption to model firm perceptions of fiscal policy--related constraints including taxation and public expenditures taking two different forms: flows of public services and stocks of public capital.
The paper makes two contributions. The first is to evaluate, based on a class of endogenous growth models, whether business perception data could be useful in identifying the optimal direction for fiscal policy reform. We show that, regardless of model parameters, it is likely that firms perceive the (distortionary) tax rate as a more severe constraint than public service--related constraints, which in turn are likely to be perceived as more severe than public capital--related constraints. Firms view fis-cal constraints in this order even when taxes and spending are set at their optimal, growth-maximizing values (i.e. where changes to any fiscal parameters would result in declines of the growth rate). However, this framework also predicts that for comparisons of fiscal constraints involving simi-lar types of public spending (e.g. between two public service--related, or two public capital--related, spending categories), business perception data do not suffer from such systematic biases vis--à--vis optimal policy responses.
The second contribution is to compare actual business perception data from the World Bank Enter-prise Surveys, and in particular how firms rank fiscal policy--related constraints, with the ranking pre-dicted by the endogenous fiscal--growth framework. We find that the WBES rankings of fiscal policy-related constraints closely match those predicted by the theoretical models.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Politikempfehlungen zur Förderung von Wirtschaftswachstum basieren idealerweise auf theoreti-schen Modellen und auf empirischer Evidenz. Letztere ist traditionell das Ergebnis statistischer Aus-wertungen von aggregierten fiskalpolitischen Daten mittels Regressionen. In der Literatur werden Politikempfehlungen, die auf dieser Art von empirischer Evidenz basieren, allerdings zunehmend kritisiert, siehe z.B. Rodrik (2005) 
Introduction
It has long been understood within theories of economic growth and development that changes to …scal policy, including changes in the composition of public spending, a¤ect aggregate outcomes such as the rate of economic growth (Barro, 1990 , Devarajan et al. 1996 . Increasingly, cross-country empirical evidence has been found to support these model predictions. For instance, Adam and Bevan (2005) , Lopéz and Miller (2007) , and Hong and Ahmed (2009) …nd that greater productive expenditures, usually de…ned as including spending on transport, communication, education, and health, have signi…cant, positive growth e¤ects. The consistency of these …ndings suggests that these …ndings are robust, but because they are generated using macro
data they are open to the criticisms that the exact transmission mechanisms through which public spending are e¤ective are left unclear, and that they are likely to mask variation in the e¤ects of …scal policy on di¤erent …rms (Schwellnus and Arnold, 2008) .
In this paper, using data for South African …rms, we investigate di¤erences in the e¤ects of changes in the mix of public spending on …rm level productivity. There are various channels through which education, health and transport expenditure may a¤ect private sector productivity. In growth models with public …nance, public expenditure a¤ects growth mainly through its e¤ects on the marginal product of factor inputs including labor and capital. For instance, private equipment such as machinery and vehicles can be employed more productively when public infrastructure is in place, and people with access to basic health care can work more productively; see for instance Agénor (2008a,b) who summarizes relevant empirical evidence to motivate an endogenous growth model with public …nance that incorporates public spending in these areas. As aggregate growth outcomes must ultimately be the result of changes to productivity that occur at the …rm level, …rm-level data can provide evidence for a speci…c channel through which aggregate growth outcomes could occur. More importantly, because aggregate policy changes are unlikely to be determined by the individual …rm, our approach deals more convincingly with any simultaneity bias complementing 1 those results of the macro literature.
To conduct the analysis we exploit the particular …scal context in South Africa, and in particular the institutional mismatch between revenue-raising and spending powers at the provincial level. This has the advantage that it allows us to control for the government budget constraint in our estimations, an issue shown to have a strong e¤ect on results in macro growth regressions (Kneller et al., 1999) . All broad based taxes are identical across South African provinces and borrowing at the sub-national level is limited. As a result, the level of public spending is largely exogenous to the individual province and dependent on grants from the central government. Discretionary …scal policy choices instead di¤er across provinces and time in South Africa in terms of the chosen mix of expenditures. Our empirical speci…cation therefore focuses on the e¤ects of changes to the mix of public spending and separates them from e¤ects of changes in the level of spending. The …scal data also include details on public spending beyond those usually available, including various types of health, education and transport expenditures by province. This allows us to both exclude components of these expenditures, such as those on administration, where the productivity-enhancing e¤ects for …rms are less obvious, but also to broaden the analysis of …scal policy e¤ects on …rm performance compared to previous studies that mostly focus on changes in transport infrastructure. 1 As an additional advantage, public spending data from South Africa is of high quality compared to other countries which we discuss in greater detail below.
That the e¤ects of taxation can be separated from those of expenditures on South African …rms in addition to the use of micro data does not in itself indicate that the correlations we uncover are causal of course. An important 1 See for instance Datta, 2012; Shirley and Winston, 2004; and Reinikka and Svensson, 2002 . The papers that are closest to ours are Bekes and Murakozy (2005) and Gabe (2003) . The former uses data from Hungary and …nds that public investment by the central government has positive and signi…cant e¤ects on …rm productivity, and that public investment by municipalities has negative and signi…cant e¤ects. Two potential problems with their estimation are that municipalities are rather small so that public investment may entail signi…cant spillovers which they do not control for and that they do not take into account the government budget constraint. Gabe (2003) uses expenditure and revenue variables to explain …rm growth (measured as the change of employment) in the U.S. and does not …nd large and/or signi…cant e¤ects of …scal policy. consideration here must be whether …scal expenditures are targeted at particular industries in particular provinces because they have lower or higher productivity than elsewhere. Or it could occur that unobserved province-speci…c factors, such as unobserved economic shocks, a¤ect the productivity of …rms within an province and, through the automatic stabilizer mechanism, may generate a change to the mix of expenditures. To deal with the omission of di¢ cult to observe economic shocks to provinces and industries we include full set of province-year and industry-year dummies in all our regressions. To control for time-invariant omitted province-industry speci…c factors such as geography or climate that may determine the mix of expenditures and a¤ect the productivity of …rms we also include in all speci…cations a full set of province-industry dummies. This set of dummy variables rules out province-time, industry-time and province-industry omitted variables as possible explanations for our results. However, these factors do not control for economic shocks that are province-industry speci…c, or for national policies that are aimed at industries in particular provinces. To control for this possibility we also test the robustness of our …ndings to the inclusion of province-industry-time dummies.
In these regressions, to identify the productivity-enhancing e¤ects of public spending we exploit di¤erences in these e¤ects between …rms that are located within the same industry and province which we show are driven by their capital-labor ratios. That the capital-labor ratio is critical for the effects of public spending on productivity can be directly derived from the type of transmission channels discussed above. For instance, labor-intensive …rms can be expected to be more susceptible for basic health spending, and spending on public transport. The reason is that these spending categories primarily a¤ect labor productivity. To correct for any province-speci…c industry e¤ects that may cause the average capital-labor ratio to vary systematically across provinces and industries, where this may include the composition of public expenditures, the capital-labor ratio of the …rm is measured relative to the mean in each individual industry, province and time period. This implies that we are comparing across …rms that operate within the same province and industry but have chosen to use di¤erent combinations of capital and labor. If, as seems plausible, these di¤erences in the capital-labor ratio are exogenous to any common province-industry economic shocks, then these di¤erences can be exploited to identify the e¤ect of changes in the expenditure mix on …rm performance. As another advantage of using the capital intensity as a way to identify the e¤ects of public spending, we automatically control for any independent e¤ects that capital and labor may have, given that we estimate a production function with capital and labor as independent variables. The presentation of this identi…cation strategy is our …rst contribution.
Our second contribution is to apply this type of identi…cation to our data. Given the categories of public spending that we label as productive, we anticipate that these e¤ects are stronger for …rms that use labor relatively more intensively, i.e., those with relatively low capital-labor ratios. The disadvantage of our approach is that we cannot identify the overall magnitude of the e¤ect of …scal policy on …rm performance as any direct e¤ects of …scal policy on productivity are captured by the province and industry dummies we include. The question we answer is therefore narrower than the cross-country correlations between …scal policy and growth that motivate this study.
To preview our results, we …nd that reallocating public resources towards productive categories (de…ned as subcomponents of expenditures on education, health, and transport) has a robust, positive and signi…cant e¤ect on the productivity of …rms with capital-labor ratios in the bottom quartile of the distribution within their industry, province and year over the medium run. For those …rms that use capital-to-labor with a greater intensity, we uncover less robust e¤ects. The e¤ects are always positive, but only occasionally signi…cant. From this we conclude that there is evidence that those …rms that choose to use relatively more labor than capital compared to others in their industry in that province and year bene…t most from a change in the expenditure mix towards productive spending. These …ndings are robust to a number of well known biases that arise in the estimation of …rm level production functions and to the inclusion of omitted factors at the …rm, industry, province, or time period that may help to determine …rm productivity. These robustness checks include the use of the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator and …rm …xed e¤ects to address the endogeneity of factor inputs. These …ndings are also robust to a number of other potential concerns, for instance to the exact de…nition of productive expenditure that we choose.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 3 develops the modelling framework. Section 4 discusses the results, and Section 5 presents several robustness checks of the results. Section 6 concludes.
Data

The System of Fiscal Decentralization in South Africa
The features of …scal decentralization in South Africa are central to our estimation strategy. Since the end of the Apartheid era, South Africa has undergone wide-ranging …scal reforms, and a system of transparent, constitutionally compliant intergovernmental …scal relations has been created.
Government now comprises three spheres: national, provincial and local. The …scal system departs from conventional prescripts of …scal federalism however because there is a mismatch between expenditure and revenue powers at each of these di¤erent levels of government (Ajam and Aron, 2007) .
Public expenditure policy is decentralized in a range of important areas. Provincial governments are largely responsible for spending on provincial roads, education (except higher education), health services, public transportation, social welfare services, housing and agriculture. For these functions, the level of public spending by the national government is very low, and the national government is mainly responsible for setting minimum norms and standards and for monitoring the overall implementation by provincial governments. It also collects data on provincial public spending (Momoniat, 2002) . The expenditure that the national government undertakes can be expected to leave …rm productivity una¤ected over the medium run, or it …nances public goods such as national roads or higher education and research.
In these cases, signi…cant country-wide spillovers imply that there is no or little variation between the provinces. By contrast, provincial governments provide goods and services that are unlikely to entail signi…cant spillovers across provinces.
At the same time, the revenue side of government in South Africa is fairly centralized: provincial governments collect very little revenue, and the income raised within the province typically amounts to less than 5% of the provincial budget (Ajam and Aron, 2007) . In the period that we consider, provinces have neither imposed nor collected broad base taxes, and the revenue collected came from various licences (notably motor vehicle licences), sales of goods, services and capital assets and various small base taxes (e.g. taxes on gambling and horse racing). In addition, while in principle, provincial governments are allowed to borrow to …nance capital expenditure, in practice borrowing is quite limited. Provincial governments are therefore highly dependent on transfers from the national government. They receive conditional grants which they have to earmark for pre-speci…ed purposes, such as health, infrastructure, housing and social development, and they receive non-earmarked grants (which are referred to as 'equitable share grants') (Ajam and Aron, 2007) . The level of the latter that a given province receives depends on range of social and economic indicators.
These features together with the high quality of public spending data which we discuss below make South Africa an interesting testing ground to empirically evaluate the productive e¤ects of public spending. First, the system of …scal decentralization implies that regional variation in the level of spending on central sectors is observable. Monitoring at the national level lowers di¤erences in terms of public spending e¢ ciency across provinces, and data collection at the national level is likely to imply that public spending categories are nearly identical. Second, given the government budget constraint, the e¤ects of public spending depend on the …nancing mechanisms and are therefore intertwined with those of taxation. In South Africa, the fact that the national government levies most taxes which are identical across provinces while provincial governments are in charge of expenditure categories allows us to distinctly estimate the 'net'e¤ects of public spending. This limits the degree of unobserved heterogeneity across provinces.
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The e¤ects of public spending we estimate will not contain the e¤ect of their implicit …nancing through possibly productivity distorting forms of taxation of the type reported in Schwellnus and Arnold (2008) . In the regressions any productivity e¤ects from the tax system in South Africa will be captured by province-time e¤ects.
In order to ensure that our results are relevant for policy, it is important to take into account which expenditure policy parameters provincial governments are able to set. Given that the level of total expenditure by the provinces is almost completely determined by grants from the national governments which are largely beyond the control of provincial governments, at least over the short-to medium run, it is the composition of public spending where the discretion and autonomy of provincial governments seems to be much more important. Any e¤ect that the level of …scal expenditures might have on the productivity of …rms will again be captured by the province-time e¤ects also included in the regression.
Firm level Data
The information on …rms that we use is from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. These data are rich in detail on …rm characteristics, and are designed to be representative of the population of …rms. However, they contain, at least in comparison to other …rm level datasets, a relatively small number of observations and a limited panel dimension. We use data from two rounds of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys in South Africa in 2002 and 2006, providing a total possible sample of 1,113 observations for use in our regressions.
The use of questions within the survey that ask for information for earlier years means that while most control variables are only available for 2002 and 2006, information on …rm output and most inputs is in principle available for four years (2000, 2001, 2002 and 2006) . The panel is unbalanced with an average number of years per …rm of approximately 1.95. We recognize that an implication of the limited time dimension of the data is that we are likely to identify productive e¤ects from public spending that are relatively instantaneous and miss those that take longer to a¤ect …rm decisions. Finally, we corrected the data for obvious keypunch errors, deleted observations with negative inputs or outputs and one observation with idiosyncratically high sales volatility.
The …rms surveyed are located in four out of nine South African provinces and include Gauteng, Western Cape, Kwazulu-Natal and Eastern Cape (in descending order by the number of …rms located in each province that are included in the surveys). Within each province considered, the majority of the …rms are located in the biggest city (Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth). As most …rms are located far away from other provinces, it seems unlikely that they bene…t from spending from other provincial governments thereby minimizing problems related to estimating the e¤ects of public spending in the presence of bene…t spillovers.
At the …rm level, we use total …rm sales de ‡ated by a sector-speci…c de ‡ator as a proxy of …rm output, the net book value of equipment and machines de ‡ated by an economy-wide de ‡ator as a proxy of private capital, the number of employees, and the cost of materials and intermediate goods which we likewise de ‡ate using an economy-wide de ‡ator. We further use information from the Enterprise Surveys to construct dummy variables for foreign …rms, large …rms, exporting …rms and …rms that experienced losses due to crime. 2 These represent other …rm speci…c factors that might a¤ect a …rms' productivity. Tables 1 and 2 contain details about the …rm level variables and descriptive statistics.
Public Spending Data
Given that the location of each …rm is known, it is possible to merge our …rm level data with provincial spending data provided by the South African Treasury. Our provincial dataset includes public spending that is disaggregated at the sub-sectoral level. In principle, our dataset also includes control variables that re ‡ect the quality of education and road infrastructure in each province, but the e¤ects of those variables are all captured by province-time e¤ects. While public spending data may often only poorly re ‡ect public outputs in terms of public services delivered and public capital accumulated, anecdotal evidence suggests that public spending data from South Africa is relatively reliable and reaches the bene…ciaries in most cases. Ajan and Aron (2007) note for instance that the quality of …scal data, budget planning and control at all levels of government has been improved as part of the …scal reforms. A report commissioned by Delegation of the European Union in South Africa also …nds that the level of transparency in South Africa's budget processes is high (Quist et al., 2008) . The Open Budget Survey ranks developing and developed countries based on their budget transparency and accountability.
South Africa regularly ranks among the top …ve countries suggesting that abuse or ine¢ cient use of public resources would be much easier to spot and is therefore more unlikely to occur.
Provinces spend, among other things, on education, health, road infrastructure and public transport. Following Kneller et al. (1999) and others we label these as productive spending (we do not consider spending by the national government which cannot be traced by geographical location and which can be assumed to have signi…cant nation-wide spillovers given the types of public goods and services it provides or by municipalities where existing data are not su¢ cient). Our data also allow further disaggregation of these expenditure functions. Given that the time dimension of the …rm-level data limits our ability to consider long lags of productive e¤ects of public spending, we use this to exclude subcategories of education, health and public transport and capital expenditure that may be expected to a¤ect …rm productivity to a lesser extent or not at all over a period of around two years. Following convention, we label the remaining / excluded public spending categories as unproductive. 3 Table 3 provides an overview of how we categorize public spending. For instance, in the education and health sectors, we exclude administration spending. The remaining expenditure may plausibly a¤ect …rm productivity over the medium run.
Obviously, some parts of productive expenditure can only be expected to a¤ect private sector productivity over the very long run, such as the construction of a new bridge or tunnel which takes years to complete but which may increase productivity of private vehicles by cutting travel time. Here, we focus on productive e¤ects of public spending that are likely to materialize over a period of 1 to 2 years. Spending on public transport, tra¢ c management and road maintenance are likely to deliver much more quickly tangible bene…ts. Spending on public health may also rapidly improve labor productivity, if for instance it results in increased availability of drugs against common diseases, or if public awareness to prevent accidents or certain types of diseases increases. Even spending on education may have almost immediate e¤ects on productivity: for instance, as a result of education spending on early childhood development, labor productivity of the parents may improve fairly quickly. In addition, improved education of students shortly prior to graduation or spending on short courses for adults may a¤ect labor productivity over the medium run. Nevertheless, we consider the robustness of the our results to these choices in Section 6.
We express the amount of productive public spending as the share of total provinces over the period considered, but the relative increase varied and ranges from around 17% in Western Cape to around 25% in Eastern Cape.
Modelling Framework
As is typical in the literature we assume that output, Y it , of …rm i in year t, is produced using private capital (K it ), labor (L it ), and materials (M it ). Into this framework we incorporate as an additional variable a composite public input that represents the level of public services and public capital and that enhances …rm productivity, G tp , which varies across time and provinces, where p denotes the province. As production technology, we use the type of CES production function originally proposed by David and van de Klundert (1965) which allows for the e¤ects of G pt to be not Hicks-neutral:
G pt can be written as where T pt denotes total public spending in a given province in year t, pt denotes the share of total public spending on G pt (i.e., that is devoted to productive categories), and C pt represents other province-speci…c factors that relate to the e¢ ciency of public spending.
Including G pt in the production function of …rms re ‡ects for instance the fact that private vehicles can be used more productively when the quality of the road network increases, that the cost of using private vehicles due to lower maintenance requirements falls and that labor productivity is a¤ected by various public services, for instance by those that are health-related. This is what we refer to as the productive e¤ects of public spending. 4
Ki and Li -together with factor-speci…c parameters K and L among other factors -determine the productive e¤ects of a given level of G pt . 5 We thereby assume that some of the key parameters that determine the output elasticity with respect to G pt , Ki and Li , are …rm-speci…c. A priori, there is no reason to believe that these parameters are identical across all …rms, and indeed, there is a host of reasons of why this assumption is likely to hold true. For example, the location of each …rm determines access to public services and thereby the impact of G pt on …rm productivity. We exploit this assumption below to identify the productive e¤ects of public spending.
An important concern in the empirical estimation of the e¤ects of the composition of public expenditures on …rm productivity is the omission of variables that are correlated with the expenditure mix and the error term in the regression. This form of endogeneity bias might be caused by timevarying changes to the preferences of regional governments towards private enterprise. For example, regions could in principle adopt a strategy of openness towards international trade and FDI in order to encourage growth and investment and compensate the (perceived) negative e¤ects of this by voters to the security of their employment by increased welfare payments (Rodrik, 1998) . Alternatively, expenditures might be targeted at particular provinces because there is some province speci…c factor, such as its geography, that raises (or lowers) the productivity of all …rms located there. In order to control for this possibility we include in all regressions a full set of provinceyear e¤ects (D pt ) and industry-year e¤ects (D jt ) e¤ects. We further test the robustness of our results to the possibility that regional governments might target particular industries by including province-industry-year e¤ects.
The province-year e¤ects that we include in the regression are obviously perfectly collinear with G pt which is the variable of interest. To identify the e¤ects of …scal policy we instead exploit di¤erences in their e¤ect across pliers may enable the …rm to purchase inputs at lower prices. Public spending, especially on public infrastructure, may improve …rm productivity through positively a¤ecting these determinants of TFP. Shirley …rms. While di¤erences in neither Ki nor Li across …rms are observable, we use information on the capital-labor ratio of …rms, which to again remove the e¤ects of province or industry level factors we express as a ratio to the annual province-industry mean. We anticipate that …rms that are relatively labor-intensive in their production technology compared to other …rms in their industry in that region in the same year are more likely to bene…t from spending on health, education and public transport for example.
It is straightforward to show that the capital intensity relative to the annual province mean, K it L it = Kpt Lpt , is not driven by G pt itself but only by how susceptible …rms are to G pt . 6 Pro…t maximization implies that the ratio of the marginal products of labor and capital equals the ratio of factor prices.
Dividing this equation by the same condition of a hypothetical …rm producing mean output, Y pt , using mean inputs in the same province and year yields
where z is a constant that is determined by di¤erences in relative factor prices across …rms in one province. If factor prices are identical across all …rms, z = 1. Rearranging (3) yields
which shows that the capital intensity relative to the annual province mean is only determined by exogenous parameters, and notably by di¤erences of K i and L i between …rms which, from (1), determine the di¤erences of the productive e¤ects of G pt across …rms within one province and year.
In the econometric speci…cation, we also take into account di¤erences across industries, for instance in terms of the production technology. To estimate the e¤ects of G pt , we then simply group …rms by their capital intensity relative to the annual-province-industry mean, i.e., whether their relative capital intensity is low, lower medium, higher medium or high based on the quartiles of the distribution of the relative capital intensities across all …rms in all provinces and years. We also approximate (1) using a Translog function:
where the subscript j denotes the industry and where all variables are in logs (which is denoted by variables in lower case) which is the equation which we estimate and where low, lmed, hmed represent dummy variables for the …rms with relative capital intensities, K it L it = K pjt L pjt ; below the 25th, between the 25th and the 50th and between the 50th and 75th percentiles, respectively, which we each interact with pt (the share of productive public spending in total expenditure). We do not include an indicator of high k=l …rms, such that the e¤ects of the public expenditure mix on low and medium capital intensity …rms are measured relative to that group. 7 Given that capital and labor (in logs) are already included in various ways in the empirical speci…cation, we do not include the capital intensity as an additional indicator in the regressions. These interaction terms therefore capture whether changes to the mix of public spending a¤ect the production technology depending on their relative capital-labor ratios. This approach does not allow inferring the magnitude and the sign of the overall productive e¤ects. However, it seems highly unlikely that reallocating resources from unproductive to productive expenditure categories has overall negative e¤ects on …rm productivity, and theory does not provide any plausible transmission channel for such a scenario.
Note that we have also substituted for G pt using (2) where T pt and C pt are implicitly captured by province-time e¤ects (D pt ) that we include and cannot therefore be separately interpreted. It follows that because the province-time e¤ects include the e¤ects of total spending, we implicitly hold this constant in the analysis. In this regard we follow a tradition established in the macro literature by Devarajan et al. (1996) Given the lack of a counterpart in the empirical literature, we feel that it is important to establish the robustness of our …ndings to a number of di¤erent methodologies. Our base regressions come from estimating (5) using data for 2002 and 2006. In order to exploit the full four years of …rm data and to improve the identi…cation of the parameter values on the private inputs in the production function, our second methodology estimates (5) in two steps.
In the …rst step we estimate (5) including only all private inputs as righthand side variables using all four years of available data. In this step, we include a full set of …rm …xed e¤ects and province-year e¤ects for 2002 and 2006, to avoid any bias caused by omitting the remaining variables including the …scal variables in this regression. 8 In the second step, we use OLS and impose the coe¢ cients from this …rst stage regression on the relevant private input variables in (5) and include back in the …rm and …scal variables omitted from the …rst stage. This approach is of course equivalent to that used to construct measures of productivity from the residuals of an econometrically estimated production function. Finally, concern over the possible endogeneity of investment, and therefore the capital stock, leads us to implement the estimator proposed by Levin-sohn and Petrin (2003) . Implementation of the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator requires at least three years of data. As already noted, whereas our …rm level variables are available for up to four years, our measure of productive public spending are available for only two years. To ensure that the coe¢ cients on the private inputs are robustly identi…ed we again proceed in two steps. In the …rst step we follow the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator as usually applied:
the …rst step properly identi…es the coe¢ cient on investment controlling for its possible endogeneity. The second step is then identical to the above and includes the …scal variables of interest.
Results
In Table 5 Table 5 . This may be a consequence of the use of a Translog production function and the relatively small number of observations compared to many of the micro level studies that have examined the relationship between internationalization and …rm productivity.
Turning next to the …scal variables in regression 1, the results for the productive expenditure variable can be interpreted as the e¤ect on …rm level productivity from an increase in the share of productive expenditures compensated by a pro-rata decrease in types of non-productive expenditure, leaving total expenditures constant. Regression 1 suggests that this type of …scal policy change is associated with higher …rm productivity for those …rms with a relatively low ratio of capital to labor (relative to the respective provinceindustry-year mean). Our estimates imply that a 1 per cent change in the expenditure mix towards productive expenditure is associated with a rise in …rm output of 0.22 per cent. According to this result, changes in government expenditure have a stronger e¤ect on output than changes in private capital for these …rms.
To evaluate the magnitude of these e¤ects further, from Table 4 we calculate that the average increase in the share of productive expenditure within South African provinces over time (relative to the mean) was equal to 4 per cent (the mean is 0.552 and the within province standard deviation 0.022). Multiplying this number with the coe¢ cient estimate suggests that the productivity-enhancing e¤ects of changes to the expenditure mix is equal to 0.88 per cent for …rms with a low capital-labor ratio. The magnitude of these e¤ects is economically important. The average change in sales over time measured by the within standard deviation divided by the mean of …rms with a low relative capital intensity is 3.94 per cent, such that …scal policy contributed an estimated 22 per cent of this change.
For …rms with medium capital-labor ratios we …nd evidence of positive, statistically signi…cant e¤ect from the productive expenditure share on their productivity. That the estimated elasticity of public spending on …rm per-formance is strongest and signi…cant for …rms in the bottom quartile of the distribution for the relative capital-labor ratio may be a consequence of the types of …scal categories that we label as productive, such as education, health and public transport. Data limitations on the panel element of our dataset prevent us from exploring whether the e¤ects di¤er over the long run across …rm types, but in Table 7 below we discuss results where we broaden and narrow the types of expenditures we consider as 'productive'.
In regression 1 we identify the e¤ects of changes to the mix of public expenditures by using di¤erences in their impact across …rms after controlling for all time-varying province and industry level factors that may a¤ect a …rms' productivity along with time-invariant province-speci…c industry factors. In regression 2 we control for the possibility that there are di¢ cult to observe factors at the province-industry-time level that a¤ect …rms'productivity and are correlated with the …scal expenditure mix. Our results are left unchanged from the inclusion of these province-industry-year dummies. We continue to …nd evidence that those …rms that have a low ratio of capital to labor relative to other …rms in their industry in that province are positively a¤ected by shifting the expenditure mix towards productive categories and away from unproductive ones. We now also …nd that the magnitude of this e¤ect is roughly identical to regression 1. For …rms with a medium relative capital intensity, the magnitude of the e¤ect increases relative to regression 1 and remains signi…cant. This is a persistent feature of the results we present; the positive e¤ect of public spending on …rms that use more labor relative to capital is robust.
In speci…cations 3 and 4 of Table 5 , we consider the robustness of our …ndings to the two-step estimation strategy outlined above, where we use all four years of …rm level data to improve the identi…cation of the parameters on the private inputs in the production function. In the …rst stage of speci…cation 3, we include …rm …xed e¤ects and province-time e¤ects for 2002 and 2006. Again the results are robust to this point. 9 In the two-stage estimation results we continue to …nd that the coe¢ cients on the …scal variables are sta-tistically signi…cant and that the estimated elasticities are largely unchanged.
Changing the mix of province-level expenditures towards productive spending categories and away from unproductive categories whilst holding the total budget constant, is associated with increases in …rm level output for …rms with a low capital intensity.
A similar outcome occurs when we use the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator in the …rst stage of our 2-step estimation strategy to correct for the endogeneity of the estimated coe¢ cients on private inputs (speci…cation 4 in Table  5 ). When using the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator we …nd that the estimated coe¢ cients on productive expenditures for the low capital intensity groups are now larger compared to the previous regressions in 5, but still signi…cant.
Finally, in regression 5 we use the wild cluster bootstrap estimator proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) to further control for intra-class correlation at the province and industry level. In this speci…cation, we are technically only able to include province-year e¤ects. The coe¢ cient on the share of productive expenditure for …rms with a low capital intensity remains signi…cant and robust, although their magnitude decreases.
Robustness of the Results
In Table 6 we consider the robustness of our results to changes in the de…nition of productive expenditures as well as other …rm-expenditure interactions.
Thus far we have used di¤erences in the relative factor intensity of capital and labor in the …rms'production function to identify the e¤ects of changes to the public expenditure mix on their performance. It follows from the decision to express these capital-labor ratios relative to the mean value in each industry, province and year, along with the province-time and province-industry dummies that we include, that our results cannot be explained by di¤erences in the characteristics of particular industries, or because province-speci…c di¤erences in relative input prices lead to di¤erent factor intensities across provinces. Firms from the various industries and provinces are spread across the di¤erent quartiles. Along similar lines our results cannot re ‡ect the decision by an entrepreneur to open a …rm producing a particular type of product in a particular province because the expenditure mix in that province favors a production technology of that type. Such e¤ects will instead be re ‡ected in the mean value of the capital-labor ratio.
The possibility that other …rm level variables might explain our results, or may also be important, remains however. For example, if larger …rms tend to be on average more capital intensive than smaller …rms then it might be the relative size of …rm, rather that capital-labor intensity, that is important.
Alternatively, it is now well established in the international economics literature that exporters and foreign owned …rms are larger and more productive than …rms that are not internationalized in these ways and it is possible that these are the relevant …rm characteristics. In the regressions in Table 6 we consider this possibility. In speci…cation 1 in Table 6 , we also include interactions between export status and the share of productive expenditure. The results show that the coe¢ cients remain robust and statistically signi…cant, whereas the interaction term of the share of productive public spending in total expenditure with export status is not signi…cant. In speci…cations 2 and 3, we consider whether productive expenditure has di¤erent e¤ects on large …rms or …rms that are (partially) foreign owned. (i.e., we interact the share of productive expenditure with the respective dummies). According to our results, this is not the case.
In the remaining regressions in Table 6 we use the amount of labor, relative to the province-industry mean, (regression 4) and the size of the capital stock, measured relative to the province-industry mean, (regression 5) as the relevant …rm characteristics implying that the low, lmed. and hmed: dummies refer to these variables relative to the annual province-industry mean.
In all cases, we again use province-time, industry-time and province-industry e¤ects to control for other omitted determinants of productivity. We do not …nd that the share of productive expenditures matters for any of these types of …rm. Firms that are small, or medium sized, when measured by either the amount of labor or capital they possess relative to the annual average …rm in their industry and province, are not signi…cantly a¤ected by the mix of public expenditures. We conclude from this exercise that the relevant …rm characteristic is their use of physical capital relative to labor and that …rms that have relatively low capital-labor ratios are positively a¤ected by the types of productive public expenditures we examine.
In Table 7 , we further test the robustness of our results. In speci…cation 1 of Table 7 , we add …rm …xed e¤ects. Even though we only have two years of data, our results remain robust. So far, in our speci…cations, total unproductive expenditure, i.e., expenditure within the health, education and transport sectors and in other sectors, has implicitly been the omitted expenditure category in the sense that we assumed that this type of expenditure compensated, on a pro-rata basis, an increase of productive expenditure. Even though we control for unobserved, time-variant province-speci…c e¤ects, there may still be the concern that the share of productive expenditure in total expenditure is a¤ected by economic shocks because included within the denominator are transfers and similar expenditures that may exhibit some pro-cyclical behavior. Speci…cation 2 addresses this concern: instead of including productive expenditure as a share of total expenditure, we now express productive expenditure as a share of total expenditure on education, health and transport sectors. Here, we assume that whilst the level of spending on health, education or transport may respond to random shocks to the economy, within those categories the spending decisions are made based on di¤erent policy priorities. For example, the share of spending on emergency medical services or administration is a policy decision una¤ected by the position in the business cycle, even if total health expenditure is a¤ected. Speci…cation (2) suggests that our results remain robust and that reallocating resources from unproductive areas in the education, health and transport sectors to productive areas positively and signi…cantly a¤ects …rm productivity in the bottom capital-labor ratio group, although the e¤ects in the medium group are not signi…cant.
We then test whether our results are driven by the particular way in which we group …rms based on their relative capital intensity. In speci…cation (3), instead of using quartiles, we use quintiles of the distribution of the relative capital intensities across all …rms in all provinces and years and therefore distinguish the e¤ects of public spending across …ve groups of …rms. In speci…cation (3), our results remain robust in the sense that the e¤ects of the share of productive public spending is largest and signi…cant in the bottom group. 10 In the remaining two speci…cations of Table 7 , we test whether our results are driven by the particular way in which we de…ne productive expenditure. Thus far we have used a particular de…nition and include sub-categories of education, health and transport as well as capital expenditure that may be expected to be productive over the short run. When we include all subcategories of health, education and transport as well as capital expenditure, where this now includes expenditures on administration, in speci…cation (4), the coe¢ cient of the share of productive expenditure is again statistically sig-ni…cant. That the coe¢ cient also increases suggests perhaps that our initial assumptions was too severe and that these other sub-categories have important productive e¤ects over the short to medium run. In speci…cation (5), we are more selective and only include few subcategories of education, health and transport spending. We exclude all education spending on the grounds that their productive e¤ects may be subject to longer lags and only include early childhood development based on the notion that this increases labor productivity of the parents. We exclude all health spending except for district health services, which is likely to have more immediate e¤ects on labor productivity compared to provincial health services which in part may be targeted at those people who are severely sick and who are hence not part of the labor force. Finally we include spending on public transportation spending but now exclude any transport management and transport infrastructure spending. The coe¢ cient decreases in size, but remains positive and signi…cant in this regression.
Conclusions
This paper examines whether changes in the composition of public spending a¤ects …rm productivity and whether these e¤ects depend on …rm characteristics. Since it is well known that estimating production functions gives rise to various biases, we use a variety of estimators and econometric speci…cations.
We show that in general the composition of public spending matters for …rm productivity, and that there is robust evidence that its e¤ects vary across …rms depending on their capital intensities relative to the annual provinceindustry mean. Firms that are labor intensive in relative terms appear to bene…t to a greater extent from the forms of productive spending that we consider compared to more capital intensive …rms. Our identi…cation strategy which we have derived from a standard production function framework allows us to control for any omitted province-speci…c time and industry effects.
We leave several possible extensions for future work. The robustness of the results could be further tested through the use of additional estimators and empirical methods. Our identi…cation strategy probably addresses potential endogeneity more convincingly than most other papers that analyze the productive e¤ects of public spending, both at the macro and micro level. Nevertheless, concerns may still remain. For instance, our identi…cation strategy does not allow controlling for provincial di¤erences in the relative productivity of low capital-labor ratio …rms relative to high capitallabor ratio …rms which could a¤ect our results. One constraint of our data is certainly the availability of …rm information across fairly short time periods, but we argued that productive e¤ects arising over the medium run are plausible, and as a robustness checks, we further narrow the subcomponents of education, health and transport expenditure that we consider as having productive e¤ects over the medium run. In addition, the type of data we use in combination with our empirical speci…cation implies that we are unable to evaluate the aggregate e¤ects of changes in public spending composition on …rm productivity. However, from a theoretical point of view, it seems highly unlikely that changes in the composition of public spending in favor of productive categories lower overall private sector productivity. In this sense, our …nding that productive public spending positively a¤ects productivity of …rms with a relatively low capital intensity implies that the productivity of these …rms increases in absolute terms, and not only relative to …rms with a high capital intensity. There are other aspects of the dataset that could be exploited further. For instance, it would be possible to compare the e¤ects of di¤erent components of productive public spending; to compare the e¤ects of aggregate productive public spending when o¤set by di¤erent elements of the government budget; and it would be possible to explore the role of additional …rm characteristics for the e¤ects of public spending.
In contrast to other studies that evaluate the productive e¤ects of public expenditure empirically, we fully take into account the government budget constraint and …rm characteristics simultaneously. This feature allows us to draw well founded policy conclusion. First, governments are able to boost …rm productivity by reallocating a greater share of public spending towards productive expenditure categories. Given that productivity at the …rm level is likely to be fundamental for long-run, aggregate economic growth, this is less expensive than raising overall public spending including productive spending. This is of current relevance given the large budget de…cits due to the recent economic crisis in many countries. Changing the composition of public spending, rather than raising productive spending and leaving unproductive spending unchanged which in turn increases the overall level of public spending and may require issuing debt for example, would seem from our evidence to be one feasible option of how …scal policy can be used to increase the medium-to long-run growth potential of the economy. Second, if governments attempt to raise …rm productivity via the reallocation of public resources, it is however important that they take into account the characteristics of …rms. While this issue needs to be further explored in future research, it seems reasonable that for instance, the e¤ects of public spending and its components depend on the technology of …rms that in turn drives their capital intensities. 
